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Abstract 
Positive and negative feelings were central to the development of economics, especially in 
utility theory in classical economics. While neoclassical utility theory ignored feelings, behavioral 
economics more recently reintroduced feelings in utility theory. Beyond feelings, economic 
theorists use full-fledged specific emotions to explain behavior that otherwise could not be 
understood or they study emotions out of interest for the emotion itself. While some analyses 
display a strong overlap between psychological thinking and economic modelling, in most cases 
there is still a large gap between economic and psychological approaches to emotion research. 
Ways how to reduce this gap are discussed. 
 
Keywords: classical, neoclassical and behavioral economics, utility theory, 
ex-ante emotions, ex-post emotions, anxiety, craving, disgust, regret, rejoicing, disappointment, 
elation 
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Current emotion research in economics  
 
Pleasure and pain are undoubtedly the  
ultimate objects of the Calculus of Economics 
W. Stanley Jevons (1871, 1957, p. 37) 
 
Why would emotion researchers from other disciplines (e.g., psychology, philosophy, 
sociology) be interested in the way in which emotions are understood and studied in 
economics? What is there to be learned? To start with, it might be interesting to see that 
economists draw and learn a lot from psychology. What is characteristic to economic analysis, 
however, is the use of formal mathematical tools. In the process of formalizing psychological 
ideas about determinants of emotions, the contents of these ideas get shaped, become more 
precise, and/or are elaborated further. This yields new insights in these determinants, which 
may also be of interest to other disciplines than economics. Going one step further, almost any 
theoretical economic analysis comprises a description of the process of decision making. 
When these analyses are extended to allow for emotions, they also offer insights into the 
influence of emotions on the outcome of decision making – in addition to several other 
determinants of decisions.  
We present an overview of emotion theories and research in economics, organized in 
three sections.1 The first section addresses the role that feelings play in utility theories from 
classical economics, neoclassical economics, and behavioral economics. This historical 
digression allows us to better understand some of the current discussions in economic emotion 
                                                     
1 We restrict our survey to theoretical analyses in core journals of economics. The reader is referred to Wälde 
(2016) for a more comprehensive version, which also comprises references to psychological surveys of the role of 
emotions in decision making and for a more extensive treatment of the formal background.  
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research. The second section addresses the role that specific full-blown emotions, rather than 
mere feelings, play in economic analyses.2 Finally, Section 3 focuses on the questions what 
economists can learn from emotion psychology, and what psychology and other disciplines 
can learn from emotional economics – the analysis of emotions in economics.  
The Place of Feelings in Economics 
The natural place to look for emotions in economic thinking is ‘utility theory'. Utility 
theory gives an account of the process of decision making, which requires a comparison of 
values of different objects. Walking through the history of utility theories in economics, we 
see that feelings sometimes have been ignored and sometimes incorporated: In classical 
economics, utility was clearly perceived as a measure of an individual's feelings. Neoclassical 
economics, by contrast, provides a framework that allows predicting human behavior without 
any reference to feelings. Behavioral economics, which can be considered as a renaissance of 
classical economics with more sophisticated research tools, provides interpretations of utility 
that again allow for the role of feelings.  
Classical economics 
The term utility was introduced into economics in 1776 by Adam Smith in his path-
breaking book "The Wealth of Nations" (Stigler, 1950a, p. 307). It is defined as the "value in 
use" of a certain good, for example, the value of using a piece of furniture. This differs from 
the "value in exchange", which would be the price of the piece of furniture. It was left to 
Bentham (1789, 1970), however, to make utility a popular concept. He made the famous 
statement that "Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, 
pain and pleasure" (p. 11). His analysis then continued with a discussion of various types of 
pleasures (e.g., from wealth, skill, power, expectation, and relief) and pains (e.g., of desire, 
disappointment, regret, and expectation). The importance of understanding feelings was 
                                                     
2  We follow psychology in considering feelings as one among several other components of emotions or emotional 
episodes (next to information processing, action tendencies, and expressive behavior). 
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expressed even more forcefully by Jevons (1871, 1957).  He used the term utility "to denote 
the abstract quality whereby an object serves our purposes". This object is then said to "afford 
pleasure or ward off pain" to its user (both quotes from p. 38). Like Bentham, he considered 
pleasure and pain to be "the ultimate objects of the Calculus of Economics" (p. 37). This 
interpretation of utility as a feeling was shared by Edgeworth (1881, 1967, p. 67), who 
understood utility as a form of pleasure and the maximization of social welfare as achieving 
the "greatest possible happiness" (p.67).  
Neoclassical economics 
The introduction of the concept of utility into economics was accompanied by a 
discussion of how utility could be measured and whether it could be compared across 
individuals. Jevons (1871, 1957) strongly denied that utility could be measured, stating that 
"we can hardly form the conception of a unit of pleasure or pain" and that the idea of 
"quantities of feelings" is out of the question (Stigler, 1950a, p. 317). As a reaction to this 
difficulty, neoclassical economics developed theories of decision making that are free of any 
explicit discussion of feelings. We illustrate this by discussing three variants of neoclassical 
economic theories: the preference-based approach, the choice-based approach, and expected 
utility theory.  
The preference-based approach 
In the preference-based approach, human beings are described in terms of ‘preference 
relationships’, which expresses their tastes. Such a relationship could state for a certain 
individual that a consumption bundle x (e.g., 5 loafs of bread and 3 bowls of ice-cream) is "at 
least as good" as a consumption bundle y (e.g., 4 loafs of bread and 4 bowls of ice-cream). 
Symbolically, this is represented by x≿y. Any real-world individual would then be described 
by one preference relationship on a very large (if not infinite) number of consumption 
bundles. Under fairly general conditions, this preference relationship can be represented by 
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the formula u(x)≥u(y), which states that utility from x is at least as large as utility from y. 
Based on the assumption that individuals want to maximize utility, predictions about human 
decision making are possible if we endow the individual with a certain amount of resources 
(labour income, capital income, wealth, valuable goods) and inform him/her about prices of 
the goods. 
The standard interpretation of this approach does not allow any room for feelings. As 
Varian (1992) put it: "A utility function is often a very convenient way to describe 
preferences, but it should not be given any psychological interpretation" (p. 95). Yet, our 
intuitive understanding of “preferences”, “tastes”, and "at least as good as" do suggest that 
feelings are involved. If I prefer ice cream to bread, this means that I have a more positive 
hedonic experience when eating the ice cream than when eating bread. Therefore, the 
preference approach is not in itself incompatible with an interpretation of preferences as 
involving feelings. Feelings could provide the psychological micro-foundation of economic 
preference relationships. 
The choice-based approach 
The choice-based approach (going back to Samuelson, 1947) puts forward the notion 
of “revealed preference relationships”, with an emphasis on “revealed”. The relationships for 
an individual would then state that a certain consumption bundle x is “revealed preferred” to a 
consumption bundle y (symbolically, this is often expressed as x≿∗y). The big difference with 
the preference-based approach is that the revealed preference relationship ≿∗ is defined with 
respect to observables and not with respect to tastes of an individual: A consumption bundle x 
is “revealed preferred” to y if an individual chooses x and if both x and y are affordable by the 
individual. As Mas-Colell, Winston, and Green (1995) put it, a "theory of individual decision 
making need not be based on a process of introspection but can be given an entirely 
behavioral foundation". Some authors (Brandstätter, Güth, & Kliemt, 2007) argue that the 
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choice-based approach to individual decision making in economics is the incarnation of 
positivism in the philosophy of science as is behaviorism in psychology, and that economics 
is now currently undergoing a cognitive revolution. 
Expected utility theory 
The models of decision making discussed so far are based on the assumption that we 
live in a deterministic world, as they do not refer to any potential source of uncertainty or risk. 
This limitation is overcome by expected utility theory, which can be considered as the 
standard economic decision model under risk today.3 According to this version of utility 
theory, the “expected utility” of an action option equals the sum of the values of the possible 
outcomes of the action times the subjective likelihoods that the action will indeed lead to 
these outcomes. An individual faced with the decision between two action options calculates 
the expected utilities of both action options and chooses the action with the highest expected 
utility. Take an individual who has to decide between spending the next weekend outdoors or 
indoors, without having certainty about what the weather will be like, and hence whether 
his/her choice will lead to the desired outcome. This individual has to rely on the values of 
indoor and outdoor activities given each weather condition combined with the probabilities of 
these weather conditions.  
Similar to the deterministic (preference-based and choice-based) utility models 
discussed above, the expected utility model as originally designed does not leave room for 
feelings. This neoclassical, feeling-free view of utility is the most widely held in economics, 
whether implicitly or explicitly. As Kahneman, Wakker, and Sarin (1997, p. 375) put it, 
"Utility is inferred from observed choices and is in turn used to explain these choices." There 
is no need to think about whether utility is a feeling, leave alone what type of feeling it is. It is 
a construct, which is not and even does not need to be observed.  
                                                     
3 In economic decision theory, a distinction is drawn between risk (objective probabilities) and uncertainty 
(subjective probabilities; see Gilboa, 2009; Knight, 1921).  
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Behavioral economics 
The neoclassical approach discussed in the previous section equates utility with overt 
choice, thus ignoring the distinction between what makes individuals truly happy and what 
they choose. As Gul and Pesendorfer (2008) put it, in "the standard approach, the term utility 
maximization and choice are synonymous". In other words, what an individual is observed to 
do is, by assumption, what maximizes his/her utility. This feature of the neoclassical approach 
has spurred alternative proposals, which go by the name of behavioral economics, to return to 
an interpretation of utility in terms of feelings. For instance, Loomes and Sudgen (1982, 1986) 
took utility to mean “experienced utility”, thereby putting themselves in the tradition of 
classical economics again. For them, the utility function measures "the psychological 
experience of pleasure that is associated with the satisfaction of desire" (Loomes & Sugden, 
1982, p. 807). From now on, we use the term experienced utility to refer to the type of utility 
that does not only depend on observable choices but also on subjective feelings and/or values. 
Note that the analyses in the section “Emotions in economics” all adopt an experienced utility 
view.  
Kahneman et al. (1997) took the proposal of Loomes and Sudgen (1986) one step 
further by splitting utility into decision utility and experienced utility and by arguing that both 
types usually fall apart in reality and must therefore be treated as different objects in theory. 
Decision utility is inferred from the overt choices that people make. Experienced utility is 
itself again split into three subtypes: (a) instant utility, which results from the outcome of a 
decision (e.g., consumption, health, and social status), (b) remembered utility, which an 
individual recalls (potentially in a biased way) from past outcomes, and (c) predicted instant 
utility, which is anticipated by the individual. 
One important challenge to the neoclassical utility theory by behavioral approaches is 
the use of non-choice data. While the use of self-report and physiological data to measure 
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subjective well-being is standard in psychology, this is traditionally not so in economics. 
However, in one area of behavioral economics, namely happiness research, the measurement 
of subjective well-being (in the spirit of Clark, Diener, Yannis, & Lucas, 2008; Diener, Suh, 
Lucas, & Smith 1999) is common. Economists working in this field asked whether average 
happiness in society rises over time, and found that it does not, even when countries become 
richer (Easterlin, 1974, 2001; Stevenson & Wolfers, 2008). This was dubbed the Easterlin 
paradox. Economists also asked whether unemployed workers are more or less happy than 
employed workers. Choice-based approaches reasoned that given that unemployed people 
choose not to work, they must attach a higher utility to not working than to working. Yet there 
is abundant evidence that unemployed workers report lower happiness values than employed 
workers, even when the differences in income and other socio-economic factors are taken into 
account (Clark and Oswald, 1994, Di Tella, MacCulloch, and Oswald, 2001, Ohtake, 2012). 
This suggests that unemployed workers would rather like to work and that at least a part of 
their current status is due to factors outside of their choice. 
One final extension in behavioral economics worth mentioning is that utility can be 
construed as not only depending on one’s own consumption but also on the consumption of 
others. This extension allows an explanation of altruism and envy within a utility framework 
(see Becker, 1976; Rabin, 1993; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999). If we denote utility of individual A 
by uA, then her utility would be given by uA=u(cA,cB), where cA is consumption of A and cB is 
consumption of an individual B (which could also stand for a large group of individuals). The 
utility function u(.) would rise in both arguments such that one could meaningfully talk about 
altruism of individual A with respect to individual B. If utility rises in cA but falls in cB, one 
could talk about envy of individual A with respect to individual B. More elaborate versions of 
this idea can be found in Rabin’s (1993) and Fehr and Schmidt’s (1999) treatments of 
fairness. These economic analyses of altruism and fairness are not in the first place about 
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trying to understand the underlying feelings but more about the effects of altruism and 
fairness on behavior. The same seems to be true for the literature on reciprocity (Sobel, 2005). 
Reciprocal behavior could have an intrinsically high value (the individual likes reciprocal 
behavior per se) or it could be instrumental (the individual behaves reciprocal as he/she 
expects a return). 
Emotions in Economics 
We now look at the role of full-blown specific emotions in economic analyses. This 
section distinguishes between (a) ex-ante or anticipatory emotions, which occur at the 
moment of the decision making and before the outcome is revealed (e.g., fear of a negative 
outcome, desire or hope of a positive outcome) and (b) ex-post emotions, which occur after 
the decision is taken and when the outcome is revealed. If future ex-post emotions are 
anticipated at the moment of the decision making, they are called anticipated emotions. In 
addition to studying the quality of emotions, some economic researchers also study the 
intensity of emotions, and the evolution of this intensity over time.   
Economic emotion models deliver two types of knowledge. First, they provide an 
account of the origins or determinants of specific emotions, borrowing frequently from 
psychological insights. The formal analysis that is typically undertaken in economic analysis, 
however, further details and shapes these insights. Second, economic models provide an 
account of how specific emotions influence utility and hence the outcome of the decision 
making process. In other words, they take emotions as one among several determinants of 
decisions. Both types of knowledge will be illustrated in the treatment of ex-ante and ex-post 
emotions and in the research on the dynamics of emotions.  
Ex-ante emotions 
Ex-ante emotions or anticipatory emotions occur at the moment of decision making 
and are caused by the current anticipation of an uncertain event that will take place at a future 
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point in time. Illustrations include an individual who needs to go to a doctor for a diagnosis, 
an investor considering the acquisition of a large stock of risky assets, or a child looking 
forward to her birthday. We consider models that have analysed the ex-ante emotions of 
anxiety and craving vs. disgust. In the economic literature, some models are static while 
others use an explicit dynamic framework (i.e., which includes different time points). Our 
discussion of anxiety is dynamic, whereas our illustration of craving vs. disgust neglects 
dynamic aspects. 
Anxiety 
An explicit model of ex-ante emotions, in particular anxiety, was developed by Caplin 
and Leahy (2001).4 Think of an investor who, for simplicity, lives for two time periods only, t 
and t+1. He makes an investment at time t and, at time t+1, he receives an interest rate or 
return, denoted by rt+1. This return is uncertain at time t. The return can take any value and a 
simple example would be values of -1% in the bad case and +1% in the good case. The 
investor owns a certain amount of wealth wt in t (say 1000 EUR) which he can split between 
consumption ct and the investment it. In period t+1, his consumption level amounts to the 
original investment plus the interest payments on it, ct+1 = it + rt+1 it. Imagine his optimal 
decision implies investment of 300 EUR (and therefore consumption ct of 700 EUR in the 
first period). Then his/her consumption level ct+1  in t+1 equals 300+3 EUR in the good case 
when the interest rate is +1% or 300-3 EUR in the bad case when the interest rate is -1%.  
To understand the decision process of the investor, we need to describe his 
preferences. The investor values consumption and experiences anticipatory emotions. 
Instantaneous utility in the first period t is a function u(.) of consumption ct and the emotion 
at. Instantaneous utility in t is therefore written as u(ct,at). In period t+1, the investor has the 
same utility function u(.) but there is nothing to be anticipated (as life is over at the end of 
                                                     
4 For earlier work on ‘savouring’ and ‘dread’ in a world without uncertainty, see Loewenstein (1987). To see how 
much more theoretical work is needed to account for empirical findings, see Harris (2010). 
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t+1). Instantaneous utility in t+1 is therefore u(ct+1,0). Anticipatory emotions arise as the 
interest rate rt+1 is uncertain. Caplin and Leahy (2001) specify the anticipatory emotion as 
anxiety. Anxiety is assumed to rise in the variance of the interest rate and to fall in its mean: 
The more there is uncertainty, the more the investor is "anxious" that the interest rate may 
differ from its expected value. At the same time, however, when the expected value of the 
interest rate rises, anxiety falls. Imagine that the variance is constant but some marvelous 
mechanism can increase the average interest rate. It seems plausible that this would make an 
investor less anxious about the outcome of the investment. If the average interest rate is large 
enough, (negative) anxiety could turn into (positive) suspense. 
When we specify a certain functional form for the utility function and anxiety, we can 
compute optimal investment levels it. Optimal investment is a function of the following 
determinants: preference and personality parameters, the expected interest rate, its variance, 
and – the new feature of this setup – anxiety. Such a framework predicts (at least) two 
relationships: (1) The more an individual is worried about the variance of the return and the 
less this worry reduces in the average return, the less the individual will invest. Why? 
Worrying a lot about the outcomes of an investment creates a lot of negative feelings with 
respect to investments. The optimal reaction is therefore to reduce investments. (2) The 
predictions become richer when we consider the degree to which anxiety matters to an 
individual relative to the utility he/she can gain from consumption. We predict that an 
emotional individual (for whom anxiety matters more) will save less only if he/she worries 
enough. In other words, there is a dependency of the emotion effect on the worry effect: An 
emotional individual could save more if he/she worries less. 
Craving vs disgust 
Laibson (2001) proposed an analysis of consumption behavior that is driven by habits, 
which in turn are developed through cues and subsequent rewards. As an example, think of an 
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individual walking through the streets and the many advertisements he/she encounters for 
drugs such as cigarettes. These cues can induce strong desires for consuming this drug. 
Craving for a drug can then simply be understood as high marginal utility from the drug.  
To see this most clearly, consider an individual who in principle enjoys drugs and 
food. Following Laibson (2001), the essential aspect of the decision problem can be described 
by a utility function that reads u=(cdrug-x)α (cfood)1-α. Consumption of drugs is denoted by cdrug, 
consumption of food by cfood, and both variables are assumed to take on a positive value. The 
parameter x denotes a cue (an advertisement for cigarettes), which is positive but not as large 
as the consumption itself (cdrug). The individual’s preference for the drug is captured by a 
preference parameter α which satisfies 0<α<1.  When the individual can use a certain amount 
of money to buy drugs and food, s/he would consume an optimal amount of both drugs and 
food of which the exact quantity depends on the preference parameter α, the cue x and the 
prices of drugs and food.  
Now imagine the cue becomes more positive, that is, x rises (but still remains below 
cdrug). Then, marginal utility from consuming drugs rises, meaning that the increase in utility 
resulting from an increase in drug consumption rises. This can be seen as a formal translation 
of strong desire or craving. The more intense the cue, the higher the increase in utility from 
drugs. As a consequence, drug consumption rises. In an extreme case, the individual will stop 
consuming any food and use all of his/ her money for drug consumption. 
By simply reversing the valence of the cue x in the same utility function u, one can use 
this framework to also understand disgust or horror (i.e., the opposite of craving). Suppose 
that the cue encountered by the person would be a warning message on tobacco packaging 
instead of an advertisement praising the good. Given the same utility function as above, when 
the cue x is sufficiently negative (the warning message is sufficiently explicit), an individual 
might actually choose not to consume drugs at all. If cues are negative enough, marginal 
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utility from drugs becomes very small (the more x approaches minus infinity, the closer 
marginal utility from cigarettes lies to zero). This very small increase in utility from an 
additional unit of consumption could be called disgust or even horror. One and the same 
structure (the utility function u) can therefore illustrate the link between emotion concepts of 
opposite meaning by simply varying the sign of the cue x. 
Ex-post emotions 
Ex-post emotions occur after the decision has been taken and the outcome of the 
decision is revealed. Illustrations include the outcome of a medical exam, of getting married, 
or of accepting a new job. We consider models that have analysed the ex-post emotions of 
regret vs. rejoicing, and disappointment vs. elation.  
Regret vs. rejoicing 
In Loomes and Sugden (1982), experienced utility of the individual resulting from a 
choice does not only include utility from the choice per se (as standard neoclassical 
economics would have it) but also regret or rejoicing relative to the alternative. Imagine an 
individual who can spend holidays in Italy (option 1) or in France (option 2). If she decides to 
go to Italy but, once she arrives, there is more sun in France (which is the alternative), she 
would regret the choice. If there is more sun in Italy than in France, she would rejoice. To 
formulate this idea a bit more precisely, assume the weather in Italy and France can be rainy, 
cloudy, or sunny. The world can therefore be in 3x3=9 states j (see Figure 1). 
 
Italy\France Rainy Cloudy Sunny 
Rainy 1 2 3 
Cloudy 4 5 6 
Sunny 7 8 9 
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Figure 1: The states j of the world with Italian weathers in the rows and French weathers in 
the columns 
 
When we simplify Loomes and Sugden’s (1982) approach as much as possible without 
losing the essential points, we denote utility for the individual that chose option 1 and the state 
of the world being j by u(c1j,c2j)=c1j+R(c1j-c2j). Utility from the choice of option 1 in state j is 
represented by c1j, utility from the choice of the alternative option 2 in state j is c2j, and R(c1j-
c2j) measures regret or rejoicing. It would make sense to assume that (a) there is neither regret 
nor rejoicing (R(c1j-c2j)=0) for states 1, 5, and 9, (b) rejoicing (R(c1j-c2j)>0) for states 4, 7, and 
8, and (c) regret (R(c1j-c2j)<0) for states 2, 3, and 6. 
When the individual makes a choice about where to go on holiday, the state j of the 
world is unknown. She therefore has to base her decision on the expected utility from both 
options. The expected utility U1,2 from option 1 is given by the sum of the utilities in a given 
state of the world weighted by the probability pj that this state will actually realize, 
𝑈1,2 = ∑ 𝑝𝑗𝑢(𝑐1𝑗, 𝑐2𝑗)
9
𝑗=1 . 
The expected utility U2,1 from option 2 is then expressed in perfect analogy. When 
considering going to France, the alternative is Italy (option 1). Utility in state j of the world 
when having chosen option 2 is u(c2j,c1j)=c2j+R(c2j-c1j). Here, there would be regret (for states 
4, 7, and 8) or rejoicing (in states 2, 3, and 6) in exactly the opposite way as described above 
for the choice of Italy. The expected utility is then given by 
𝑈2,1 = ∑ 𝑝𝑗𝑢(𝑐2𝑗, 𝑐1𝑗)
9
𝑗=1 . 
It is interesting to note that even though individuals are assumed to maximize expected 
utility, this is not an example of expected utility theory as defined previously. Utility here 
depends not only on the utility cij from the actual choice but also on the hypothetical utility 
that the alternative choice would have provided. 
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When the individual makes a decision where to spend holidays, this decision is based 
on both expected utilities. An individual will go to Italy (i.e., prefers option 1 over option 2), 
whenever the expected utility from Italy is larger than the expected utility from France (i.e., 
whenever U1,2>U2,1). 
The setup implies that standard, non-emotional decision making is a special case of 
this setup. When one assumes that R(c1j-c2j)=R(c2j-c1j)=0 for all states, a person’s holiday 
choices only depend on utility c1j and c2j from option 1 and 2 in state j. Individuals would not 
compare after the decision is taken and would just experience a certain utility level from the 
current weather conditions wherever they ended up spending their holidays. One can easily 
imagine that allowing for emotions via the function R has a strong impact on predictions 
about choices. 
Disappointment vs. elation 
In their study on disappointment and elation, Loomes and Sugden (1986) again focus 
on ex-post emotions that result from the match or mismatch between the outcome of a choice 
and some reference point. While the reference point in the cases of regret and rejoicing was 
the hypothetical utility of an alternative option (e.g., going to Italy), here the reference point is 
the expected utility from the option chosen (e.g., going to France). An individual is 
disappointed if the actual utility is lower than the expected utility (e.g., when it rains) and 
elated when the actual utility is higher than the expected utility (e.g., when there is sun). 
An alternative approach to disappointment is proposed by Gul (1991). Like Loomes 
and Sugden (1986), Gul (1991) also defines elation relative to some reference point. But 
while the reference point for Loomen and Sugden (1986) was expected utility of c₁ and c₂, for 
Gul (1991) it is the so-called "certainty equivalent" of the uncertain choice.5 Take again the 
                                                     
5 The certainty equivalent c of a random outcome x yields the same utility u(.) as expected utility from the random 
outcome, u(c)=Eu(x). As an example, imagine you have to choose between a certain amount of money (e.g., 30 
EUR) and a lottery ticket (e.g., 60% chance of winning 100 EUR and 40% chance of winning 20 EUR). If you are 
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holiday choice between Italy and France under uncertainty discussed above. If the outcome 
(weather condition) is better than the certainty equivalent, the individual is elated; if not, the 
individual is disappointed. While Loomes and Sugden (1986) write down a convincing and 
intuitively plausible form, Gul (1991) derives the utility function from various axioms that 
remain as close as possible to axioms of expected utility theory.  
The dynamics of emotions 
Emotions in economics traditionally have been modelled as something instantaneous. 
When there is an uncertain event in the future, there is an emotion of anxiety or suspense. 
When the event in the future is taken away (e.g., the exam is canceled), the emotion is gone. 
When the individual experiences a negative outcome (e.g., a bad mark on an exam), there is 
disappointment, but when the negative outcome is taken away (e.g., the mark is corrected), 
disappointment is gone. There is a lot of evidence, however, that emotions sometimes only 
gradually build up while at other times they build up very quickly (see Heylen et al., 2015, for 
the case of anger).  
In a recent model of the dynamics of stress, Wälde (2015) studied the pattern of a slow 
increase and a slow decline of emotions. In the presence of a stressor, stress gradually builds 
up. When the stressor is taken away, subjectively felt stress only gradually falls. Sometimes it 
takes an entire weekend to recover from a stressful week at work—or an entire week to 
recover from a stressful weekend. This explicit dynamic structure offers a formal background 
for understanding cross-over of emotions from work to the private domain and also spill-over 
processes of emotions onto partners (Bakker & Demerouti, 2012).6 
                                                     
indifferent between the certain amount of 30 EUR and the lottery ticket, then the 30 EUR is the certainty equivalent 
of the lottery ticket.  
6 There is a large field of emotion research based on “psychological game theory” (Geanakoplos, Pearce, & 
Stacchetti, 1989). It studies emotions depending on other people’s presumed emotions and beliefs, such as feeling 
guilty when disappointing a person that trusts in one’s behavior. Immediate emotions and visceral factors are 
analysed by Loewenstein (2000). See Wälde (2016) for a more extensive treatment of these issues. 
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Why Emotional Economics is Useful 
For economics 
Economic theory advances by taking emotions into account. Including emotions (or 
the mechanisms leading to them) as additional determinants of decision making can improve 
the predictive power of existing economic decision models. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) 
forcefully argued that observed choice behavior presents many violations to fundamental 
axioms of expected utility theory. To accommodate these violations, Loomes and Sugden 
(1982) developed a theory of decision making that is descriptively more successful in 
explaining observed human behavior than standard expected utility models. The motivation 
for Gul (1991) was similar: Behavior observed in experiments departed in a systematic way 
(giving rise to the so-called Allais paradox) from central axioms of expected utility theory 
(the independence axiom). Gul posed the question of how this axiom could be relaxed to 
account for this violation and how to make predicted behavior consistent with the Allais 
paradox.  
For psychology 
Is emotional economics useful for advancing psychological understanding of 
emotions? We think formal mathematical analyses in economics can further refine and 
elaborate ideas from psychology. In doing so, emotional economics also points out further 
determinants of emotions. Finally, economic theories provide detailed hypotheses about how 
emotions and other determinants influence decision making and behavior in general. These 
hypotheses can be taken as a source of inspiration for psychologists interested in how 
appraisal or information processing more broadly understood translates into action tendencies 
and actions.  
Determinants of emotions 
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The first objective of economic theorists who included emotions as one type of 
determinant of decision making was not to understand specific emotions per se but to 
understand the effects of emotions on decision making. This brought them to a decision 
theory that is descriptively more successful in explaining observed human behavior than 
standard expected utility models. Whether these authors also had an intention to come up with 
a model that describes emotions or whether a formal analysis eventually revealed a structure 
that could be given an intuitive interpretation by using emotion concepts can only be 
answered by the authors. Whatever the intention, the outcome of these analyses is a 
fascinatingly simple and elegant characterization of emotion concepts: In the models of 
Loomes and Sugden (1986) and Gul (1991), regret, rejoicing, elation, and disappointment are 
all characterized in terms of some reference point. In the model of Caplin and Leahy (2001), 
anxiety is characterized by properties of uncertain consumption (its mean and the variance), 
which in turn result from uncertain investment. As consumption also depends on an 
individual’s other income sources (apart from this specific investment), broader personal 
considerations beyond personality measures (like, for example, wage income, wealth or 
family status) could be taken into account as determinants of anticipatory emotions. 
From determinants to behavior 
Economic models are also very precise on the type of influence that determinants have 
on behavior. Is there a linear relationship or is it non-linear or even non-monotonic? Do 
changes in determinants have an immediate impact or does it take some time before the 
impact on behavior is observable? Do determinants reinforce or dampen each other?  These 
and other properties of determinants should also provide new testable theoretical predictions 
interesting for psychologists.  
Economic theory has a tendency to reformulate any type of behavior as the outcome of 
a decision process (or the solution to a decision problem). This idea can also be applied to 
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emotion regulation. In Wälde’s (2015) stress model, for example, the stressed individual 
follows a precise decision rule that makes her choose coping strategies in a systematic way. 
Gross (2008, p. 505) wrote: "one intriguing puzzle is why people use one emotion regulation 
strategy rather than another". The answer would be that personal costs and benefits induce an 
individual to decide in one way or another. Such a framework allows to understand, for 
instance, why some people predominantly use a problem-focused and others use an emotion-
focused strategy to cope with stress (Lazarus, 1991), or why some people choose to assimilate 
(continue goal striving) whereas others choose to accommodate (goal adjustment; 
Brandstädter & Rothermund, 2002). 
But the idea that any type of behavior can be reformulated as the result of a decision 
process can also be applied to initial emotional action tendencies and actions (see Bushman & 
Anderson, 2001; Eder & Rothermund, 2013; Moors, Boddez, & De Houwer, 2016). For 
instance, the tendency to flee characteristic of fear can be considered as the result of a 
decision between fight and flight.  
Mathematical analysis 
As mentioned earlier, the advances that economics can bring to other disciplines reside 
within the fact that it relies heavily on mathematical analysis. Looking at disciplines other 
than economics, one of the leading proponents of behavioral economic theory argues that 
theories developed in most social sciences are what could be called "imprecise theories" (all 
quotes in this paragraph are from Rabin, 2013). Undertaking emotion research following a 
formal approach would therefore follow "a desire to expose how <existing views> are wrong" 
or, to put it a bit more positively, to work out what existing views actually mean. As long as 
models of emotion lack mathematical rigor and precision, it is "just harder to identify flaws". 
Translating standard psychological views into an otherwise mainstream economic model 
allows us to "see their limits that can guide us in further improvements".  
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As an illustration, emotional economics could provide a formal analysis of Bechara 
and Damasio's (2005) somatic marker hypothesis. An emotion according to their definition is 
"a collection of changes in body and brain states" (p. 339). Once a cue is perceived, the body 
reacts accordingly: There are "changes in internal milieu and viscera" or "changes in the 
musculoskeletal system" (p. 339). When x (and potentially further variables) in the utility 
function u=(csweets-x)α (cfruit)1-α from above represents the state of the body (and changes in this 
variable then change the state of the body), such a theory would provide an immediate and 
very precise link between body states and observable behavior. 
Conclusion 
Economists have always been interested in emotions. This is true for the early times of 
economics when utility was taken to describe feelings of individuals about pleasure and pain. 
This is true for current research in behavioral economics that uses empirical measures of 
happiness based on questionnaires or on diary methods to quantify utility as used in 
theoretical analyses. And it is also true for various detailed studies of emotions (e.g., regret, 
rejoicing, craving, stress, anxiety, suspense, trust, and guilt) and their effect on decision 
making. 
From the articles surveyed here, it seems true that psychological emotion research has 
a strong impact on economic analyses of emotions. Many researchers cite psychological 
evidence to motivate their formal modelling. Economics gains a lot from this transfer of 
knowledge as certain behavioral regularities that could not be explained by standard economic 
models can be understood when emotions are taken into account. This economic research on 
emotions is also potentially valuable for psychologists. An economic analysis is called 
theoretical only when it is based on a mathematical model. Economic theory therefore is very 
stringent in making predictions and the underlying assumptions. This precision should bring a 
lot of potential for refining psychological theory. Hopefully this will be the case in the future.  
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